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Title: Perilous proxy: human rights and the presence of national elections *.

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Abstract:

Objective. Studies have found that democracy is associated with increased government respect for human rights, but we are not sure exactly why. The purpose of this research is to examine the effect that the presence of national elections has on government respect for a category of human rights known as physical integrity rights.

Methods. This study uses a random-effects GLS model to analyze a pooled cross-sectional time-series data set containing information about seventy-four countries from 1981 to 1987.

Results. It is found that the presence of national elections, either executive or legislative, has no effect on government respect for human rights.

Conclusions. This finding suggests that policy makers need to be cognizant of the differences between strict democracy and liberal democracy, as they are likely to be promoting one, and expecting the benefits of the other. The consequences of doing so may be disastrous in the context of what Zakaria (1997) calls "illiberal democracies."

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Introduction

Several studies have shown that democracy is reliably associated with a decrease in governmental violations of physical integrity rights, a subset of internationally recognized human rights (Henderson, 1991, 1993; Poe and Tate, 1994; Hofferbert and Cingranelli, 1996; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1997). (1) This finding has come to be a general assumption in empirical studies of human rights. Given this, the next generally interesting question to ask is "What exactly is it about democracy that allows it to improve government respect for human rights?"

The search for answers to this question has begun at the ballot box. There are at least two reasons why. The first reason speaks to why there may be some theoretical connection between elections and human rights, and the second denotes the real-world importance of the connection. There is a large body of democratic theory suggesting that elections are the cornerstone of democracy. John Stuart Mill ([1861] 1991:245) said that "human beings are only secure from evil at the hands of others, in proportion as they have the power of being, and are, self protecting." Over time, stones have turned to swords which have turned to democracy as methods of protection from the evil of others. Do elections provide as much protection as democratic theory might predict? Pilon (1998:125) notes that the "June 1997 elections in Albania ousted an unpopular president. . . largely stopping the killing." In addition, Davenport

Next, the relationship between human rights and the presence of national elections is an important policy issue, as for some time, U.S. policy makers have implied that democracy and national elections are the same thing. That is, they have used the mere presence of national elections as a proxy for democracy itself. The use of this proxy may be dangerous, however. For instance, Peru has had successively elected civilian governments since 1980, but at the same time, has suffered tens of thousands of political killings. Thus, it may be that states which formulate foreign policy using elections as a proxy for democracy do a disservice to all those who are potential victims of human rights abuse around the world.

Elections and Democracy's Ability to Protect Human Rights

The clearest finding in the research program investigating the determinants and consequences of government respect for human rights is that democracies are more protective of physical integrity rights than any other type of government. This in itself is not surprising, as democracy is especially effective at balancing the dual role of citizens as moral individuals and political equals (Dworkin, 1977; Rawls, 1971; Dahl, 1989; McColm, 1991). Democracies are typically able to govern large numbers of citizens effectively, and to respect individual rights.

Why are elections the cornerstone of democracy? Elections exhibit two essential democratic functions. First, they provide an input mechanism that allows the opportunity for citizen involvement in the political process. Second, they provide a motive for elected representatives to be accountable to their constituents. The common denominator in otherwise different definitions of democracy is a component by which citizens have some method of meaningful input into a political process (Schumpeter, 1950; Lipset, 1963; Riker, 1965; Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1971; Powell, 1982; Dahl, 1989; Farer, 1989; McColm, 1991; Bollen, 1993). This input (political participation) is arguably the key defining feature of democracy, and elections are the primary method of citizen input into the political process:

Democracy requires citizen control over the political process. . . . Citizen control over political elites is routinized through periodic, competitive elections to select these leaders. Elections are intended to ensure that elites remain responsive and accountable to the public. (Dalton, 1988:205)

Bollen's (1992) oft-cited definition of democracy asserts that democracy is a process by which, through political participation, the power of elites is minimized and the power of non-elites is maximized. Elections can be viewed as a participatory encounter between the "excluded" and the "included" in society. That is, "the excluded groups confront the controllers and supporters of sets of social arrangements that determine patterns of access to resources, services, status and power, seeking a new deal" (Stiefel and Wolfe, 1994:6). And, despite the fact that electoral participation really exercises indirect control over a government, "electoral participation does establish boundaries for governmental action," serving a "vital protective function" (Steiner, 1988:101-2). Given that citizens do not want government to abuse their human rights, and given that elections offer citizens an opportunity to stake claim in policy outputs by determining to some extent who shall wield political power, citizens would not knowingly place in positions of political power individuals that would abuse their human rights.

It is true that elections are not the only form of political participation (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1971; Verba, 1978). Powell (1982:8) states, however, that even though elections are not the only important form of participation, "electoral activity may play the essential role in forcing elites to respond to other forms of involvement." Ginsberg and Stone (1986:5) state that elections differ from other forms of participation in several respects. One difference is that:

Elections help to equalize citizens' capacities to influence rulers' conduct. . . . The capacity to influence officials' actions will therefore vary--with wealth [or] social position. . . . Elections, by introducing a formal, public means of influencing official conduct, can compensate for private inequalities in political resources.

This is important, and as Lijphart (1993) emphasizes, the quality of a democracy depends on four factors: representativeness, accountability, equality, and participation. Whatever the general good of a society may be (and here it is thought to contain respect for human rights), Dahl (1989:71) argues that the best way to reach decisions regarding this good is for citizens

to have an equal opportunity to "express a choice among the alternatives (say, by casting a vote)." Furthermore, the democratic process requires that citizens are treated as political equals (Dahl, 1989:31).

Elections encourage accountability through the threat of imposing costs on governments. The highest political cost is the loss of political control. Given the assumption that any government's innate desire is to persist, then the possibility of incurring such a high cost may act as a deterrent. Elections give citizens the ability to vote a representative or a government out of power. That is, elections serve as a mechanism whereby citizens can impose high costs on governments. Thus, accountable rulers would not arbitrarily deny individuals their rights, as the rulers know that there is a great danger that, come the next round of elections, they will no longer be in power. Moreover, Ginsberg and Stone (1986:5) add that the ability of elections to influence the behavior of governments is "partially independent of rulers' military and administrative power" and that "even if rulers have the capacity to compel obedience, popular influence is not necessarily effaced."

In allaying the fears of those concerned with proposals for a republican constitution for Tanganyika in 1962, President Julius Nyerere said, "The ultimate safeguard of a peoples' rights, the peoples' freedom, and all those things which they value. . . is the peoples' ability to say 'no' to the official, the ability to say to him: 'no you cannot do that, that is un-Tanganyikan and I cannot accept it from anybody'" (International Commission of Jurists, 1978:28-29). Without significant citizen participation in the political process, the democratic process falls short of achieving its potential good (Powell, 1982:12). Davenport (199 1:15) finds a large body of literature asserting that ". . . governments with a restrictive political structure, one in which involvement with and over policy decisions is severely limited, will take a very repressive stance with regard to its population."

Elections allow citizens to affect government respect for human rights by providing a framework in which citizens are treated as political equals and whereby they can elect to office those representatives or governments that they feel will represent their preferred policy positions--either improving human rights conditions or maintaining good conditions--and whereby they can also remove from office those representatives or governments that they feel have been abusive. The threat of being removed from power by voters provides a motive for accountable behavior by governments and their officials.

The widely regarded importance of elections to both democracy and human rights can also be evidenced by the contents of several international agreements and documents. Article 21 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that "everyone has the right to take part in the Government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives," and that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."

The Counterargument: Why "Proxy Democracy" Might Be Dangerous

There has been (for some time) a trend to "define democracy almost entirely in terms of elections" (Huntington, 1997:6). Many view the promotion of elections as a proxy for full-fledged democracy as a problem (notably Wright, 1964; Herman and Brodhead, 1984; USOCA, 1985; Ginsberg and Stone, 1986; Dogan, 1987; Mueller, 1992; Zakaria, 1997; Huntington, 1997). The inclination to use the mere presence of national elections as a proxy for such a rich concept as democracy is known as electoralism. The problem here is that many elections are not at all representative of democratic organization, and thus, a country promoting democracy abroad for its avowed benefits cannot reasonably expect the mere presence of elections to produce the benefits of fully consolidated democracy. Citizens of countries where policies of electoralism are aimed remain subject to systematic abuse of human rights:

[T]he extraordinary pressure of...intervention as well as international diffusion means that, at minimum, (new democracies) can be expected to adhere to "electoralism," meaning the regularized holding of elections, even as they continue to restrict the other political rights and

opportunities of their citizens. This hybrid mix of electoral forms and authoritarianism, which has been dubbed "electocratic rule" ... is likely to emerge in other developing areas wherever the spread of elections under foreign inspiration either precedes or is intended to coopt strong domestic pressures for democratization. (Karl, 1990:14-15)

In its fervor to promote democratic ideals, the United States has been particularly guilty of practicing electoralism. Human Rights Watch and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (1987:1-3) describe the Reagan administration as follows:

The Administration's role in...missed opportunities reflects, at least in part, a policy grounded in an unduly narrow conception of democracy. Time and again in recent years, the Administration has sought to promote democracy by urging little more than the mere holding of elections. The administration has proceeded as if popular sovereignty could be achieved through no more than the simple, periodic act of voting. [Thus,]...the Administration often has promoted democracy by doing little more than endorsing military pledges to hold free elections.

While Huntington (1997) notes that electoralism is rampant in the post-World War II era, it is by no means confined to this era. Electoralism in U.S. foreign policy dates back to the nineteenth century. Wright (1964) documents that under McKinley in 1898, the first foreign policy problem arose for which support of free elections was adopted as a solution. The problem was Cuba. The United States did not want Cuba (as a colony), and in Secretary of War Elihu Root's maneuvering to keep other powers from possessing it, the decision was made that Cuba should govern itself "decently and in order." In this instance, "free elections" became the functional paradigm for "decent and orderly government" (Wright, 1964:5). In 1903, Theodore Roosevelt used a cooked-up revolution to produce the unopposed expression of the will of the people" of Panama to confirm Panamanian ratification of its canal treaty with the United States (Wright, 1964:23).

Using the presence of elections as a proxy for democracy leads to some counterintuitive regime classifications. For example, this operationalization would require that the military regimes of Central America be classified as political democracies (Karl, 1990; Monshipouri, 1995). This leads to inconsistencies in the United States' use of democracy as a criterion for determining who its allies are. Huntington (1997:9) points out that by treating the presence of elections as democracy, in the Persian Gulf, "Saudi Arabia, America's closest ally, is the least democratic country, while Iran, America's greatest antagonist, is the most democratic country." If elections are treated as democracy, to be consistent, one would have to identify Iran as a democracy.

The fact that countries like Iran, Peru, El Salvador, Vietnam, Haiti, and many others have coupled elections with widespread human rights abuse does not inspire confidence that in and of themselves, elections can protect human rights. Herman and Brodhead (1984) describe many of the elections held in these places--elections that satisfies the principle of electoralism--as demonstration elections. In states where there is conflict and/or where there is military or other despotic rule, ". . . elections are won by those possessing the most bullets and controlling the electoral machinery. Elections may therefore substitute the form of democracy and free choice for their substance, and provide an Orwellian inversion based on fear, ignorance, limited and meaningless choices, and a militarily assured voter turnout" (Herman and Brodhead, 1984:ix).

Even elections that are not demonstration elections may not be able to protect human rights. Ginsberg and Stone (1986:6-8) offer four arguments why even free and fair elections may be of relatively limited consequence in protecting human rights:

1. The Administrative Argument: How can elections matter if most public decisions are made by unelected officials?
2. The Elite Argument: How can elections matter if candidates for public office are beholden to powerful groups, whether because the latter make large campaign contributions or because they command positions of great social and economic influence?
3. The Interest-Group Argument: How can elections matter if it is not the mass of voters, but

rather special interests, who influence policy decisions of officials?

4. The State-Management Argument: How can elections matter if vital decisions of the day are left to experts . . . military, economic, and scientific?

Ginsberg and Stone's arguments assert that elections, in themselves, may offer nothing in terms of governmental accountability, which is necessary to translate desires--such as the desire not to have one's human rights abused--into results. In this framework, government decisions are not made according to any principle of accountability to the desires of citizens. Instead, decisions are made by indifferent and unelected (thus, directly unaccountable) bureaucrats and experts or elected officials who wish to satisfy only powerful special interests or individual elites. That is, a tyranny of a minority may operate in the face of elections.

Beyond the fact that the presence of elections is to some degree associated with governments that abuse human rights, an argument can also be made that to some extent, democratization, or elections by implication, can be instead directly responsible for an increase in government violation of physical integrity. Elections are typically one of the first democratic practices to appear in a transition toward democracy. In a democratic transition, violations of physical integrity may increase "as democracy is extended before it is institutionalized" (Fein, 1995:170). That is, says Fein (1995:173), "the expansion of democracy actually increases the motives for repression among elites and parties fearing a populist victory." Bad feelings might be expressed at the ballot box, thus institutionalizing frustration and ill feelings. Karl (1990:12) notes that in new, fragile democracies, there is a significant uncertainty over the "rules of the game" and that "rigged or unpredictable" elections do not limit uncertainty.

The birth pangs of democracy may indeed be violent. Russett (1993:133-34) points out the irony that the "initial creation of democratic institutions may contribute to the explosion of ethnic conflicts, by providing the means of free expression, including expression of hatred and feelings of oppression." Huntington (1997:8) speculates that this is especially true in non-Western countries, as "elections in non-Western countries provide incentives to politicians to make appeals . . . of an ethnic, religious, or nationalist nature. Such appeals may exacerbate divisions within the country [as] . . . Democracy is a parochializing, not a cosmopolitizing, process." Surely, the most obvious way for elections to worsen government respect for human rights would be if citizens voted human-rights abusers into office. This scenario is possible in what Zakaria (1997:2) calls "illiberal democracies": The American diplomat Richard Holbrooke pondered a problem on the eve of the September 1996 elections in Bosnia, which were meant to restore civic life to that ravaged country. "Suppose the election was declared free and fair," he said, and those elected are "racists, fascists, separatists, who are publicly opposed to [peace and reintegration]. That is the dilemma."

Zakaria defines an illiberal democracy as one where there is a democratically elected regime that routinely ignores constitutional limits on its power and deprives its citizens of their basic rights and freedoms. Zakaria, Diamond (1996), and Huntington (1997) all state that the number of these illiberal democracies continues to rise.

It is a matter of dispute, however, as to what happens in these illiberal democracies over time, should elections continue. Zakaria (1997:24) laments that unfortunately, these illiberal democracies are not, in fact, in a transition from tyranny to liberal democracy, but quite the opposite. He notes that these regimes are more apt than not to slide into "heightened illiberalism." Kupchan (1998), on the other hand, notes that several Latin American illiberal democracies have moved from illiberal to liberal democracy.

Data

This study employs a pooled cross-sectional time-series data set for its empirical analysis. The data set contains information about seventy-four randomly chosen countries at three points in time: 1981, 1984, and 1987. (2) The following sections describe the dependent variable, the independent variables of main theoretical interest, and the control variables used. These descriptions are followed by a representation of the model used for the analysis.

A. Measuring Government Respect for Physical Integrity. This study focuses on government

respect for a subset of human rights known as physical integrity rights. Physical integrity rights include the rights against torture, disappearance, extrajudicial killing, and political imprisonment. The high duty of government to respect these rights is laid out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The International Covenant on Civil and Political Liberties (1966), and many regional pacts. The measure of physical integrity used in this study is a factor score derived from principal components analysis. (3) First, the level of government respect for four particular physical integrity rights was coded using an ordinal (0,1,2) scaling scheme. These rights are the rights to freedom from extrajudicial killings, torture, disappearance, and political imprisonment. For each of the four rights, the coding scheme asks, "Have there been (in a given country-year): (0) frequent violations of this particular right; (1) some violations of this particular right; (2) no violations of this particular right?"

While looking like standards-based ordinal variables on the surface, these scoring categories rest on events-based criteria. A country must have fifty or more confirmed violations of a right to be scored a (0). A score of (1) represents less than fifty but more than zero confirmed violations. A (2) denotes no confirmed violations of a right. Ordinal categories based on events data are used because these scoring categories fit the accuracy of the data being reported in the data sources. Our coding schemes must be geared to "the level of precision actually evident in the information we employ" (Stohl et al., 1986:603). At the end of the day, we know that we can make "more or less" comparisons. This is enough to allow us to make useful comparisons among countries, regions, and system types (Spirer, 1990:203). Here, "more or less" comparisons are based on the number of confirmed violations in order to make these ordinal categories interpersonally comparable, and therefore, coding more replicable.

Coding government respect for physical integrity rights was done using information contained in the annual U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International's annual reports. It has become standard procedure in the systematic study of human rights to check one source of information against another. In practice, usually State Department and Amnesty International reports are checked against each other (Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson, 1984; Carleton and Stohl, 1985, 1987; Poe, 1991, 1992; Poe and Tate, 1994; Hofferbert and Cingranelli, 1996; Gibney and Dalton, 1996; McCann and Gibney, 1996).

Information about each country-year was gathered by no less than two coders. These coders worked independently and then met to resolve differences. Differences not easily resolved by the coders were refereed by the author. These cases were rare, and indeed, most inter-coder differences were a result of one coder missing a piece of information in the source material. Given similar information, inter-coder reliability was over 90 percent.

Principal components analysis confirms that government respect for these four particular physical integrity rights loads very strongly on the same, single dimension. That is, physical integrity is unidimensional. This is an interesting finding in and of itself, as it differs from the finding of McCormick and Mitchell (1997) that physical integrity is multidimensional. The principal components loadings are:

Killings	.81
Torture	.78
Disappearance	.77
Political Imprisonment	.74

One principal component score was generated for each country-year, and is used as the dependent variable in the analysis. The values of the dependent variable range from -1.686 to + 1.559. For instance, in 1990, Afghanistan and El Salvador both received -1.686, while Costa Rica and Denmark both received +1.559 (these were not the only countries with these scores). Thus, the higher the positive score achieved, the more respectful a government is of its citizens' right to physical integrity.

B. Coding Elections. This dichotomous (0,1) variable indicates the presence or absence of national legislative or executive elections in a given three-year period. Thus, elections taking place in the 1979-87 period are covered. It is designed to demonstrate the effect that elections alone have on government respect for physical integrity. There is purposefully no account made for whether the elections are competitive, meaningful, or fair, as this study is

primarily concerned with the mere presence of national elections being used as a proxy for democracy. Davenport (1995) considers only the presence of presidential elections. However, if elections are important because of accountability, then their effect on government behavior cannot be accurately gauged when such a large, supposedly accountable structure as a popularly elected national legislature is ignored. Coding for this variable was done using information found in U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Elections since 1945: A Worldwide Reference Compendium (Garvin, 1989); and The International Almanac of Electoral History (Mackie and Rose, 1991).

C. Universal Adult-Citizen Suffrage. Universal adult-citizen suffrage is coded on a scale of 0 to 2. A score of two implies universal adult-citizen suffrage. (4) A score of "one" denotes cases where suffrage is denied to one or more groups on the basis of income, sex, race, religion, ethnicity, politics, occupation, or literacy. A "zero" means that no suffrage whatsoever exists. Coding for this variable was done using data found in the U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Elections since 1945: A Worldwide Reference Compendium (Garvin, 1989).

An interactive term is included in the model. This interactive term is created by multiplying suffrage by elections. The reasoning behind this variable is simple, but theoretically powerful. The presence of elections means nothing if no one has the right to vote. That is, the effect of elections on physical integrity is conditional on suffrage. The interactive term will signify whether the relationship between elections and physical integrity is modified by suffrage. (5)

D. Other Influencing Factors. To control for the effects of influences other than elections on government respect for physical integrity rights, I employ several control variables that have been demonstrated to have an impact on this phenomenon. Included are economic development (most notably, Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Poe and Tate, 1994); domestic conflict (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1997); external conflict (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1997); and population size (Henderson, 1993; Poe and Tate, 1994).

The data for the four control variables used here are the same data used by Poe and Tate (1994). (6) Logged GNP per capita in thousands of dollars is used as the indicator of level of economic development, and the natural log of total population of a country is used to measure population size. Dichotomous variables based on the criteria devised by Small and Singer (1982) are used to indicate that in a given country-year, a country either is experiencing a civil war, or is militarily involved in a war with an external power.

E. Model and Estimation Technique. The model used for the empirical analysis can be represented as:

Physical Integrity = Intercept + Suffrage +/- Elections +/- (Suffrage * Elections) + GNP/Cap - Population - International War - Civil War The signs for elections and the interactive term are represented by +/-, as the two schools of thought discussed would each expect a different sign. The signs for the control variables are as previous research would expect.

Stimson (1985) describes how using pooled cross-sectional time-series (PCST) data can help us make inferences across time and space. Use of PCST data, however, often comes with problems such as heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Thus, the nature of PCST data must be considered when we estimate our models. Error-correction models are one type of estimation procedure designed specifically for use with PCST data, as they account for systematic error variance across time, space, or both. This study uses a type of error-correction model known as a random-effects model. Random-effects models require generalized least squares (GLS) estimation (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993), and that is what is used here. (7)

F. Descriptive Statistics. The mean level of government respect for physical integrity for the years 1981, 1984, and 1987 was .032, .019, and .097, respectively. These scores represent low-moderate levels of government respect for these rights. A look at the raw data from which these scores were derived indicated that the average government in this time period showed full respect for the rights against disappearance and extra-judicial killing, while at the same

time showed little, if any, respect for the rights against torture or political imprisonment. For 1981, 1984, and 1987, the average level of suffrage was 1.58, 1.64, and 1.66 respectively. These levels of suffrage are all high, approaching the 2.0 mark representing full adult-citizen suffrage. The average level of suffrage in countries having held national elections is moderately high and rises steadily from 1981 to 1987 at .608, .676, and .716, respectively. Were the average level 1.0, that would mean that every country had an election in that time period.

Findings

Table 1 shows the random-effects GLS estimates for the effect of national elections on governmental violation of physical integrity, 1981-87. (8) We see that the presence of national elections is a statistically insignificant predictor of a government's respect for physical integrity. Thus, the presence of national elections, controlling for the presence of population size, level of economic development, suffrage, and involvement in international and civil war, is unlikely to increase governmental respect for the right to physical integrity. This differs from Davenport's (1995) finding that the presence of national elections ameliorates repression of political rights. The right to universal adult-citizen suffrage itself was also found to be a statistically insignificant predictor of government respect for physical integrity. The interactive term in this model indicates the extent to which the relationship between the presence of national elections and government respect for physical integrity is modified by the presence of universal adult-citizen suffrage. We see that the interactive term coefficient is statistically insignificant, indicating that the relationship between elections and physical integrity is not modified by the presence of suffrage.

Level of economic development is statistically significant. Measured in thousands of dollars, this variable shows that for every one-thousand-dollar increase in GNP per capita, government respect for physical integrity rises .060. A rise of .060 in government respect for physical integrity can be demonstrated by the difference between Nigeria in 1981 and in 1984. During this time, incidents of torture decreased from "practiced occasionally" to "do not occur," while incidents of political imprisonment increased from "some political prisoners" to "many political prisoners." Disappearances and killings held steady. This trade-off, along with killings holding steady at "happens occasionally," is not much for a one-thousand-dollar increase in GNP per capita. For countries such as Sweden, the United States, or Switzerland, an increase in GNP per capita of one thousand dollars may be marginal, but for countries such as Burma, Uganda, and Haiti, with 1990 GNP per capita incomes of \$270, \$220, and \$370, respectively, these coefficients and previous growth patterns suggest that there is little to gain in waiting for economic growth to cause improvements in governmental respect for physical integrity.

Population size, which was a weak, but significant predictor of government respect for physical integrity in Poe and Tate's (1994) study, is found here to be statistically insignificant. However, of the two countries that really drive the statistical significance of population variables in human rights research, China and India, only India is included in this random sample. Finally, consistent with Poe and Tate's (1994) analysis, both the fact that a country was involved in an international war and the fact that a country was involved in a civil war were strong, statistically significant predictors of how respectful a government was of its citizens' physical integrity.

Conclusion

This study examined the relationship between the presence of national elections and government respect for the physical integrity rights of its citizens. Taken into consideration were both democratic theory suggesting that elections might be able to protect physical integrity, and counterarguments suggesting why it might not. An empirical test was done to examine the relationship between national elections and government respect for physical integrity. It was found that the presence of national elections does not affect governmental violations of physical integrity. This is in contrast to Davenport's (1995) finding that national elections inhibit political repression of political and civil rights. In addition, in contrast to the findings of McCormick and Mitchell (1997), government respect for physical integrity was found to be a unidimensional phenomenon.

The finding here that national elections do not affect government respect for physical integrity

rights suggests that it may not be the wisest thing to use the presence of national elections as a proxy for democracy. In certain cases, use of such a proxy might be dangerous. That is, if governments really care about what is happening to people in other countries--as is supposedly manifest in the United States through both conditions for foreign economic aid and the publication of the U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--then governments would be well-advised not to use the presence of national elections as a proxy for the presence of fully consolidated democracy. Why? Because this finding suggests that elections alone do not truly hold political regimes accountable for their actions. If elections alone cannot force accountability, then the key element of democratic protection is missing, and the presence of elections is thus an unsuitable proxy for democracy. No one would express to government a desire for his or her physical integrity to be violated by government. Thus, at least as far as physical integrity is concerned, governments have no ground on which to stand to proclaim that merely because elections have taken place, the will of the people has been expressed.

This finding also suggests that policy makers need to give more attention to the difference between strict democracy and liberal democracy, as they are likely to be promoting one, and expecting the benefits of the other. Zakaria (1997) points out the dramatic post-cold war rise of "illiberal democracies" (regimes that have been democratically elected, but deny citizens their basic rights), such as Bosnia. Many more-established countries are frustrated at the behavior of these regimes, and find a coherent foreign policy difficult to construct. Zakaria notes that some of the frustration may come as a result of these nations promoting strict democracy and expecting the results of liberal democracy. The finding here, that the presence of national elections--a long-used proxy for strict democracy--does not improve government respect for human rights, shows that this may very well be true. That is, an efficient foreign policy cannot promote one thing, and then expect it to yield the same results as something else.

TABLE 1

Random Error Model GLS Estimates of the Effect of National Elections on Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights, 1981-1987

Independent Variables	Physical Integrity
Suffrage	.120 (.111)
Election	-.313 (.381)
Suffrage * Election	.273 (.213)
Economic standing	.060 * (.013)
Population	-.022 (.025)
International war	-.797 * (.282)
Civil war	-1.09 * (.188)
[R.sup.2]	.48

* $p < .05$.

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(1.) The terms "human rights" and "physical integrity rights" are used interchangeably in this

study. This does not imply that physical integrity rights are so sufficient a proxy as to be able to represent all human rights. Physical integrity rights include the rights against torture, extrajudicial killing, disappearance, and political imprisonment.

(2.) The country sample consists of Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa, Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, U.S.A., Uganda, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia.

(3.) Principal components analysis produces a variable that lends itself to GLS analysis. By transforming a "given set of observed variables into another set of variables," principal components analysis is a method which aims to achieve "economy of representation" with the objective of accounting for as much variance in the data as possible (Kim and Mueller, 1978:14-17). For an excellent discussion on how this economy is achieved, see Kim and Mueller (1978).

(4.) Lenski (1966:319) says that one of three basic conditions prevailing in democracies is "universal, or virtually universal, adult suffrage," while Crewe (1981:217) remarks, "Elections based on a full adult franchise encapsulate more directly than any other means of participation the two core principles of universality and equality--that every individual has an equal say." William Riker (1965:35) argued that since voting holds rulers responsible, "The first care of the democratic conscience ought to be the widest possible extension of the suffrage."

(5.) The interactive (or multiplicative) term correlates with elections and suffrage at .946 and .577, respectively. Because of the high levels of multicollinearity that multiplicative terms can introduce into a model, there exists some criticism about their use. Friedrich (1982) and Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990), however, demonstrate that by viewing and interpreting an interactive model in its proper perspective--that is, as a model of a conditional, rather than a general nature--then "(less than perfect) multicollinearity does not pose problems for the interpretation of the regression results" (Friedrich, 1982:803). Analyses of my model without the interactive effect demonstrated no substantive difference in the results from those reported.

(6.) Poe and Tate's (1994) data set can be obtained via the Systematic Study of Human Rights home page: <http://www.polsci.binghamton.edu/hr.htm>. For a complete discussion on the theoretical and empirical justifications for the inclusion of these four variables, see Poe and Tate (1994).

(7.) STATA 5.0 was used to do the empirical analyses in this study. The XTREG module with the re (random-effects) option invoked was used to perform the random-effects GLS estimation of the model.

(8.) One assumption of a random-effects model is that the correlation between v (cross-sectional effects) and x (group means of the regressors) is zero. STATA 5.0 reports that this is indeed the case here, so a random-effects estimation will not be biased.

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